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Abstract What can the art of living after Foucault contribute to ethics in relation to the
mediation of human existence by technology? To develop the relation between technical
mediation and ethics, firstly the theme of technical mediation is elaborated in line with
Foucault’s notion of ethical problematization. Every view of what technology does to us at
the same time expresses an ethical concern about technology. The contemporary con-
ception of technical mediation tends towards the acknowledgement of ongoing
hybridization, not ultimately good or bad but ambivalent, which means for us the challenge
of taking care of ourselves as hybrid beings. Secondly, the work of Foucault provides
elements for imagining this care for our hybrid selves, notably his notions of freedom as a
practice and of the care of the self. A conclusions about technical mediation and ethics is
that whereas the approaches of the delegation of morality to technology by Latour and
mediated morality by Verbeek see technical mediation of behavior and moral outlook as an
answer in ethics, this should rather be considered the problem that ethics is about.
Keywords Philosophy of technology  Technical mediation  Art of living 
Care of the self  Michel Foucault
1 Introduction
In the recent revival in philosophy of the art of living, Michel Foucault’s later work has
played an important role. This essay explores how Foucault’s work on ethics as art of
living can help define new perspectives in the ethics of technology.
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The background of this question is that in our so-called postmodern time the under-
standing of ethics has become troubled. In modern philosophy ethics circled around the
notion of laws or rational principles coupled with the notion of humans as free, autono-
mous agents (able to respond to the demands of morality). In postmodern thought the focus
has shifted to the ways in which language, social structures and power as well as the
material surroundings condition the existence of people. The philosophy of technology
played a key role in this debunking of long-held suppositions about the moral subject. This
is not surprising. For, philosophy of technology is about the character of technology and
how technology shapes human culture and behaviors.
For thinkers about technology in the twentieth century such as Heidegger, Ellul or
Mumford, revealing the social effects of technology served a critical purpose; their writ-
ings were clearly ‘‘warning calls’’ against the rushing spread of technology. Recent phi-
losophy of technology rather emphasizes the fact that human existence is always, and
inescapably, marked and influenced by technology. In the current terminology: ‘‘technical
mediation’’ is all around. This view has on the one hand stimulated more practice and
application oriented research. On the other hand, the inescapability of the effects of
technology seems to dissolve the ground for a more critical, ethical stance. That made
Langdon Winner (1993) worry that research on technology had been emptied of its critical
spirit.
The question concerning technology and ethics in our postmodern situation is therefore
if and how acknowledgment of mediation can go together with an ethical analysis. Two
scholars who explicitly addressed this question are Bruno Latour and Peter-Paul Verbeek.
Morality is not a purely human affair but often ‘‘delegated to things’’, analyzed Latour
(1992), and Verbeek concluded that ‘‘morality is mediated’’ (2011). These answers are not
yet altogether adequate and satisfying. The message that ethics cannot neglect the
importance of technology is clear and well taken. But ‘‘how is mediated morality different
from a reduction of ethics to the rule of technology?’’ is the obvious and pertinent follow
up question.
In Moralicide (‘the extinction of morality’) Huijer and Smits (2010) doubt that ethics
will survive the mediation approach, unless ‘new ethical vocabularies’ are further elabo-
rated. As a contribution to the search for new perspectives in ethics which suit contem-
porary conceptions of technical mediation, I will explore what Michel Foucault’s work,
especially his turn to ethics as art of living has to offer. Not only will I employ Foucault’s
work to find new directions for ethics in relation to technology. I will also, to begin with,
explore the meaning of ‘‘technical mediation’’, the ethical ‘‘trouble maker’’. That analysis
is equally inspired by Foucault and prepares the way for the presentation of how an art of
living with technology can contribute to ‘‘ethics in times of technical mediation’’.
2 Figures of Technical Mediation
While the term ‘‘technical mediation’’ has been often employed (McLuhan 2003; Ihde
1990; Feenberg 2002; Latour 1999; Kockelkoren 2003), notably Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005;
2011) has adopted it as the central concept in his philosophy of technology, advancing
towards a ‘‘theory of technical mediation’’. I will also adopt a technical mediation
approach, but with the important amendment that it does not necessarily denote the latest
theory but rather an enduring theme or problem.
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According to Verbeek, technical mediation theory can offer an alternative to the
dominant critique of technology as a dangerous power opposing humanity, without falling
back into the naı¨ve notion of technology as neutral instruments. For Verbeek the dystopian
critique of technology can be countered by a better theory of humans and technology.
Technical mediation theory could substitute inadequate understandings which are based on
the separation between instead of on the entwinement of humans and technology.
To start with, the analysis that earlier philosophies of technology lacked a profound
understanding of the entanglement of human existence with technology in terms of
mediation, can be contested. Rather, the very different ethical evaluation of the mediation
by technology marks the difference between contemporary and earlier currents in the
philosophy of technology. I do not think that finding the adequate theory leads to adequate
ethical views and can take away misplaced fears of technology.
It is true that the specific account of how technology mediates human existence is
reflected by a specific ethical evaluation. But the order is not fixed. Worries about tech-
nologies feed theories about technology, as much as understandings of technologies inform
ethical evaluations. Technical mediation then denotes the theme of the mutual dependency
of humans and technology. It is not an answer (the latest and most adequate theory), but it
refers to a problem, namely the question of how our existence is entangled in technology.
This take on technical mediation is inspired by Michel Foucault, for whom seeking
understanding of ourselves and our situation cannot be separated from ethical concern. In
his late work Foucault speaks of ‘‘ethical problematization’’ (Foucault 1992) and of a
‘‘critical attitude’’ (Foucault 2000a, 319), both denoting a simultaneous ‘‘analysis of the
limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them’’ (ibid.).
So, while technical mediation may not have been a key concept in earlier phases of the
philosophy of technology, it is still possible to ask which ‘‘figures of technical mediation’’
have been discovered. The term can serve as a lens through which one can give a new
account of past findings in the light of a philosophy of technology centered on the notion of
technical mediation. By looking for figures of technical mediation and correlating fig-
ures of ethical concern, I will sketch an historical background that will help to understand
today’s challenges in the ethics of technology.
2.1 Fabulous but Scarce Technology
In ‘early philosophy of technology’, the first phase of philosophical thinking about tech-
nology, from the Enlightenment until well into the twentieth century, the dominant con-
ception of technology was, in general, very positive, sometimes ‘utopian’. Scientific reason
and technical progress would bring humanity to a next stage, progressively overcoming the
precarious state of human existence, thus moving towards perfection and completion.
Scarcity and unequal distribution of technology were the only hindrances to the full benefit
of the wonders of technology.
Ernst Kapp and Karl Marx are two relevant thinkers with respect to the early philosophy
of technology. Both of them followed up on the philosophy of Hegel who conceived of
human history as the ongoing process in the direction of complete self-consciousness. As
awareness of the determining forces of nature and society grows, human consciousness at
the same time detaches itself from these determinations. This is the well-known dialectical
scheme in Hegel’s philosophy: a kind of zigzag movement towards ever more complete
consciousness and freedom. Both Kapp and Marx employ this scheme for understanding
the relation between technology and humans.
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Ernst Kapp, in his book Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877),1 seems to
have been the first to explicitly use the phrase ‘philosophy of technology’. Kapp was
interested in understanding what technology is and how it develops. For this he employed
the dialectical scheme. He asserted, firstly, that al technologies are projections of human
organs. Whether or not human inventors are aware of it, all technologies, in Kapp’s
understanding, are exteriorizations of functions of the human body. The hammer extends
the fist; the wheel is an extension of the human walking movement; the telegraph is a
projection of the nervous system, et cetera. This is step one in the zigzag movement. To
this, secondly, Kapp adds that in a return movement, humans start understanding them-
selves as mechanisms. Man only gains self-understanding after he has reproduced himself
in technological extensions: the skeleton came to be seen as a mechanism; the heart was
defined as a pump. Concurrently with their technical activities humans gain more complete
self-understanding.
Early philosophy of technology discovered how technology mediates human existence
along the lines of the fairly broad and abstract idea that the completion of human existence
is interwoven with and achieved by means of the development of technology. When
halfway the twentieth century (in 1946/1947) French philosopher Georges Canguilhem
was commenting on ideas like that of Kapp, he asserted that this view of technology
implies that it is a matter of course that ‘‘machine’’ and ‘‘organism’’ will proceed to merge,
thereby mutually contributing to the completion or perfection of both. Only in the very last
sentences Canguilhem remarks that to ask whether this development is ethically desirable,
would be ‘still an altogether different question’ (Canguilhem 1965, 127; my transl.) The
early approach to technology was more focused on what technology is and how it develops
than on ethical evaluation.
In the same period of early philosophy of technology, Karl Marx, too, employed a
dialectical scheme for describing historical progress. Whereas for Hegel the ongoing
development of self-consciousness was ‘pulling’ history, Marx turned this upside down
and found that it were the historical conditions that ‘pushed’ the development of the spirit.
‘Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life’ (Marx and Engels
1970: 47). The material-economic basis, which refers to the availability of resources and
means of production is the condition of consciousness, spiritual life. The material-eco-
nomic conditions have a clear link to technology and in this sense Marx can also be seen as
an early philosopher of technology. More so than Kapp, Marx did consider political and
ethical questions in relation to technology. However, for Marx too, technology itself is not
the problem, but the fact that not everybody benefits from it. Therefore, the mediation
figure of technology as the means for perfecting the human being finds its complement in
the ethical concern of the need to overcome scarcity and unequal distribution of
technology.
To this day, scarcity and fair distribution remain important themes in the ethics of
technology. Think of questions like: Who can and who cannot benefit from expensive
medical research and treatment, or, who has access to ICTs and who has not, due to lack of
finance or skill? However, next to the accessibility of technology, another theme gained
prominence, namely: technology itself may be not so miraculous, but dangerous.
1 See Chamayou (2007) for a contemporary commentary, accomapanying Kapp’s text in French translation
by Chamayou (Kapp 2007).
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2.2 Limits to the Rule of Technology
About the same time (mid twentieth century) when Canguilhem showed how for the early
philosopher of technology Kapp a merger between technology and human existence was
only natural and hardly morally problematic, other philosophers began to assert that limits
should be set to technological development. The dominant, general conception of tech-
nology reversed from optimistic, utopian, to often very pessimistic, dystopian. Unimagined
side-effects and downsides of technical progress appeared: the atomic bomb, environ-
mental crisis, social problems related to mass production and consumption, and bureau-
cracy gone out of hand. Technology was no longer a marginal theme in philosophy but
prominent philosophers devoted attention to it and these critiques remain referential until
today. This second stage of philosophy of technology was therefore called ‘‘classical
philosophy of technology’’ (Achterhuis 2001).
The classical philosophers of technology discovered and conceptualized the dangers of
the accumulation of technologies. Ellul (1964) argued that modern technology had become
‘autonomous’ at the expense of the autonomy of humans. Heidegger (1977) believed that
the technical way of thinking had come to determine how humans relate to the world: they
see the world as a stock of resources for humans to use and manipulate. The experiences
with rapidly spreading technology apparently turned around human thinking about tech-
nology. The relatively untroubled early reflections made way for an analysis that com-
pletely centered on the dangers of technology. Because technology imposes its essence
upon man, technology was no longer seen as a condition for further perfection of humans,
but as an obstacle to a proper human way of life. The dominant figure of technical
mediation is that technology accumulates into a system which takes command of man.
Instead of Kapp’s approach of understanding technology, now an ethical perspective
came to prevail. In the case of Ellul and Heidegger it seems that the domination by
technology was deemed so pervasive that a way out was hardly feasible. Yet, in general,
ethics of technology at that time was devoted to the reinforcement of resistance. One
example is the thesis by Ju¨rgen Habermas that the ‘lifeworld’ must be protected against
‘colonization’ by the ‘system’ (Habermas 1987). The lifeworld is the sphere where human
communication forms the organizational basis. In the sphere of the system economic
exchange, institutional procedures, and technology are the structuring principle. Though
useful in its proper sphere, a reduction of our whole reality to system characteristics would
mean a great threat. Another example is how Hans Jonas (1984) emphasized the need to set
limits to the rush of the technical system. The technical era requires a new ‘categorical
imperative’ (unconditional prescription, after Kant). For this Jonas wanted to rely on the
‘precautionary principle’: technologies should not be applied until it has been proven that
they do not endanger the survival of humanity. To conclude, the task that ethics took on
was limiting the rule of the technical system.
In this second stage of the philosophy of technology, the central figure of technical
mediation is that technology is accumulating into a system that takes command. This is
answered by the ethical concern to set limits or re-humanize technology. Unlike in the
earlier ethics of overcoming scarcity of technology, where technology was an unprob-
lematic precondition for human development, now technology itself is considered to be
dangerous. Limiting the further development of technology remains an important motif in
the ethics of technology to this day. But at the same time the belief that clear criteria exist
to demarcate where technology becomes ‘oppressive’ has faded. Also, the panic that many
classic philosophers expressed, following the suspicion that often limits have already been
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exceeded for long and by far, has become less intense. A new theme that has come to the
fore is that, for better or worse, humans have become hybrids with technology.
2.3 Hybrids for Better or Worse
The third phase in the philosophy that I want to address is characterized by what has been
called the ‘empirical turn’ (Achterhuis 2001). Since the 1970s, philosophers of technology
attempted to escape what they now considered to be overly abstract and univocal views on
technology of thinkers like Heidegger and Ellul. Some, such as Andrew Feenberg (2002),
sought to retain the serious concerns of classical philosophy of technology, but reformu-
lated in a less rigid form, and attempted to elaborate ideas about democratic control of
technological development in more concrete and applicable ways. Others, like Don Ihde,
Donna Haraway and Bruno Latour, almost seemed to bluntly ridicule classical philosophy
of technology. They argued that the human mode of existence cannot be understood in
opposition to technology, but only as fundamentally intertwined with it. Haraway (1985)
uses the image of the ‘cyborg’, while Latour (1993) argues that humans and things do not
exist without each other, but are always ‘hybrids’. We cannot and need not save any
original human sphere; but what we can do, according to Ihde (1990), is describe the
different kinds of human-technology relations. The figure that we are hybrids—for better
or worse captures such understandings of technical mediation.
Notably Latour has related mediation to ethics with his descriptions of how everyday
technologies mediate human behavior. In one of his typical examples, Latour observes how
a hotel key with a heavy fob (now largely replaced by access cards) assures that hotel
guests do not take the keys with them, but leave them at the hotel desk (Latour 1992).
Latour then comments that obedient behavior does not result from an increased sense of
moral duty but from the mediation of behavior by a product. Obedience has been ‘dele-
gated’ from human moral consciousness to a thing. Latour further probes that this does not
mean that technology overrules morality; to the contrary, he presented his discovery as the
‘missing mass of morality’ (Latour 1992). The new insight would resolve the alleged
problem of the decline of morality in our postmodern times. One only needs to understand
that behavior always results from the interplay of user intentions and interference by
behavior-mediating products.
This statement by Latour, however fascinating and inspiring, was not met with unan-
imous acclaim. As mentioned in the introduction, Langdon Winner (1993) regretted that
critical inspiration was lost, and Huijer and Smits (2010) see the end of ethics unless new
moral vocabularies are further developed. Verbeek (2011) and his project of theoretically
developing Latour’s probing assertion that action and morality are not reserved for humans
but belong to things met with similar critique. Would not such a symmetry come down to
the suffocation of ethics and the surrender to the power of technology? Or, if one keeps to
the symmetry, what about the confusing consequences, namely that things should also be
considered as moral agents, with rights, responsibilities and susceptible to moral appraisal
and blame? (Kroes 2012). ‘Nothing is gained but much is lost’ by the way Verbeek
confuses and mixes up the different statuses of objects and subjects, assert Illies and
Meijers (2009, 425). Martin Peterson goes as far as to assert that Verbeek’s views are
‘either false or misleading’ (Selinger et al. 2014, 303).
In a way, empirical philosophy of technology has returned to the perspective of Can-
guilhem, who asserted that—in Kapp’s approach—an ongoing merger of humans and
technology is only natural. This is in line with my view that technical mediation, as a
theme, has been important throughout history. What has changed is rather the ethical
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evaluation and specific conception of mediation. The ethical problem that Canguilhem
postponed came to dominate the debate afterwards and took the form of an attempt to avert
hybridization. Contemporary practice-oriented philosophers again emphasize the human-
technology merger, and advance detailed, empirical studies on the multiple types of impact
of technology. Hybridity is unescapable and the meaning is today considered ambivalent,
not fitting the rather coarse figures of utopian and dystopian technology.
3 Ethics in Times of Technical Mediation
What is the suitable response of ethics to the merger of humans and technology? Can an
approach centered around mediation also satisfy the wish of including ethical concerns
about the influence of technology into the analysis? Does the empirical turn in research on
technology, which describes more than it criticizes how different technologies necessarily
mediate people’s lives, mean the end of ethics? Or, can ethics renew itself and find a
method and a vocabulary to analyze the interference of technical products in human action
in ethical terms as well? A technical mediation theory that rejects the dystopian fear of
technology and insists that technical mediation is all around and inescapable does easily
fulfill this wish. A denial or attempt to ward off hybridization is indeed infeasible.
However, is there a way to avoid that this leads to passivity, indifference or even active
approval of what is deemed inescapable anyway?
What can be an appropriate answer to the conception of technical mediation rooted in
the idea that we are hybrids? How to elaborate the ambivalence of the impact of tech-
nology, in between the utopian embracing and dystopian fear of an ongoing merger? An
appropriate answer in general terms seems to go in the direction of caring for the quality of
the interactions and fusions with technology. This implies an approach that is not only
theoretical but also practical. It concerns coping with the technical conditions of our
existence as part of the art of living. It is therefore that the work of Michel Foucault on the
history of ethics as art of living provides starting points for further elaboration of these
issues.
3.1 Foucault’s Ethics as Art of Living
In Foucault’s work there was a remarkable shift of perspective from the study of ‘disci-
plinary power’ to an interest in ethics as ‘care of the self’. Most of his career, Foucault
affirmed that the freedom that modern man believes in is illusory, and that the ‘subject’ is
in fact the result of disciplinary practices characteristic of modern society (Foucault 1977).
Modernization is accompanied by subjection of people to ever more procedures and
detailed surveillance. All in all, modern society looks like a big ‘Panopticon’ (circular
dome prison, after Bentham). Foucault’s critique of disciplinary power clearly resembles
the analysis of classical philosophy of technology that all technology accumulates into a
dominating system.
Foucault’s work on disciplinary power reads like a dramatic revelation of the impotence
of ethics. In his later work Foucault approaches individuals no longer as mere victims of
power, but gets much more interested in how people themselves cope with external
influences on them. As part of an extensive research into the history of sexual ethics,
Foucault studied ancient Greek and Latin texts. He discovered that ancient ethics was
exactly about the efforts and exercises that everyone should carry out to make himself a
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virtuous person, to pursue a successful life, to stylize one’s own existence. Foucault’s
perspective thus changed from a critique of disciplinary power subjecting people towards
practical arts of living whereby people govern and fashion themselves (Foucault 1990,
1992, 2000b). Foucault claims that the ancient arts of living contain elements that are
important for a renewal of ethics today. I will very briefly discuss two elements that I
consider of central importance for ethics in relation to technical mediation: the conception
of human freedom and the notion of care of the self.
Foucault opposes the ancient arts of living to modern code-based ethics. In the ethics of
the Christian and the secular modern era humans are conceived of as free beings called to
obey moral laws. Ethics became almost identified with rationally explicating the founda-
tion of law, and ‘freedom’ was invariably postulated as a necessary condition. In the
ancient arts of living both the problem of freedom and of law received less attention. This
inspired Foucault to formulate an alternative conception of human freedom. Freedom is not
a state of independence from external influences, but an experience that humans achieve
through actively coping with circumstances. This conception of freedom is in line with
what Foucault thought to be the purpose of the arts of living in antiquity, namely the
striving for active mastery over one’s own life.
Whereas the ancient arts of living put less emphasis on the force of the law, there was
more attention to what was called the care of the self. According to Foucault, the free
subject is not a precondition for ethics, but any experience of being a subject (the first
person perspective of a desire for and ability of agency) consists of active exercises to get a
grip on one’s own life. Conducting oneself, being a subject, requires practice and effort.
Foucault calls such activities ‘practices of the self’ or ‘technologies of the self’ (technology
here in the sense of method, skill). Examples from antiquity are the keeping of diaries,
analyzing dreams, physical exercises, dieting, and maintaining friendship with a mentor for
counseling.
3.2 Care for the Quality of Our Interactions and Fusions with Technology
In his late work on ethics Foucault hardly returned to the theme of technology. Still, the
recombination of the themes of technical mediation and care of the self seems promising
for today’s ethics of technology. Firstly, Foucault’s conception of freedom as an experi-
ence of mastery helps to clarify how the impact of technology does not necessarily negate
human freedom. Every experience of subjectivity has long been intensively mediated by
various technologies. New technologies contribute to the coming about of new forms of
subjectivity. To exercise freedom is not the opposite of being influenced by technology, but
consists in coping with these influences.
Secondly, the concept of self-care is useful. It helps to see how people throughout
history have actively worked on themselves to constitute their subjectivity, gained in
interaction with the influences of the products they used. An ethics that likes to preserve a
clear separation between humans and technology often finds itself watching helplessly how
all kinds of technologies do get integrated in people’s existence. Exactly those processes of
technology accommodation can be studied very well from the perspective of an ethics of
care of the self. What are the considerations and processes at play when people integrate
partly dubious technologies into their lives? How do people get ‘used’? How do they
manage to adjust technologies to their own ends, so that they become embedded in their
lives in a meaningful way?
The care of the self as an approach in ethics thus offers an alternative perspective for the
ethical analysis of the social effects of technology. Instead of guarding an assumed frontier
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between where technology still respects human freedom and where it becomes intrusive,
ethics takes on research into the specific forms of interaction and fusion that technologies
allow for. Such an analysis combines an exploration of the effects of technical mediation
with research into the user’s activities of coping with these effects in their lives. This
approach in ethics is about the transformation of one’s existence by the engagement with
(new) technologies.
4 Technical Mediation Is All Around/Not All There Is
So, taking all the strands that I developed together, can we understand the confusion and
contestation directed at Latour and Verbeek from the side of moral and critical philosophy?
In everyday language, this may be, simply, because their approaches centered around the
notion of technical mediation make the impression of being all too optimistic and uncritical
about technological developments. On a deeper level this has to do with how the relation
between the influences of technology and ethics is understood. Their approaches in the end
equate technical mediation with ethics. Technical mediation is all around, mediates our
behavior and even our moral outlook. While this is altogether true, one still expects ethics
also at the same time to be ‘‘about’’ the impact of technology. In my interpretation and use
of Foucault, the ethics of technology means an ongoing ‘‘problematization’’, or a ‘‘critical
ontology’’ of our technically mediated existence. The aim is finding, or forcing, openings
to possible transformations of our way of being.
Latour’s analysis of the delegation of action to things is on the one hand a great tool for
problematization. It does help to raise awareness of one’s condition. But, on the other hand,
this analysis equates the influences of technology with ethics. For, that is of course the
literal meaning of the delegation probe: the laws of morality are replaced by the pre-
scriptions of technologies. The same is true for Verbeek, who follows Latour’s idea of
delegation, and tries to elaborate the probe into a theory of mediation.
While it is true that Verbeek has adopted Foucault’s art of living to reconcile technical
mediation and ethics along the same line as I, there are essential differences. Verbeek does
not see technical mediation and the hybridization of our existence as the material for
problematization, as I propose, but as literally the replacement for the moral law. His use of
Foucault comes down to a repetition of Latour’s delegation. In Verbeek’s way of thinking,
technical mediation is the answer instead of the problem (the issue, the material worth
problematizing). And this would imply (strangely and unintendedly I think) that in our
times of technical mediation when ethics entails no longer respect for the moral law, the
new ethics would be subjection to the rule of technology.
In the meantime, it appears that for Latour the delegation of morality to things was
merely a provisory attempt to redefine ethics. For, in his latest book, the extensive and
remarkable An inquiry into modes of existence, morality is discussed as the ‘‘experience of
scruples’’ (Latour 2013, 443). And this experience is about questioning the conditions of
one’s existence: things as they are now, could they be different, can they be changed? For
Latour, like for Foucault, it turns out, ethics is ultimately about problematizing the con-
ditions of one’s existence aimed at overcoming. Could it be that Verbeek, in adopting the
delegation of morality to things, has been an all-too hasty and loyal follower of the earlier
Latour?
Ethics of technology has to be about technical mediation, but this should not mean a
leap into subjecting ourselves to the effects of technical mediation. It is also a gesture of
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reflection on our technically mediated self, aimed at possible transformation. In short:
while it is true that technical mediation is all around, technical mediation is not all there is.
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